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Abstract  
This article examines the nationalistic authorship of space in Sri Lanka’s post-conflict 
Northeast as part of the state’s nation-building strategy and as a continuation of a post-
colonial process of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalistic revival. Exploring issues of historiography, 
conflict resolution, physical vehicles of ideology and collective memory, the article 
demonstrates how land policies, development and the tourism industry in a post-conflict 
context can go hand-in-hand with dispossession, militarisation and the humiliation of a 
‘defeated’ minority community.  
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 Introduction  
In May 2009, a long civil war came to an end in Sri Lanka. After nearly 30 years, the 
separatist militant group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fell to the state forces. 
The state declared the victory as a ‘second Independence’ for the island: territorial control of 
the country’s Northeast—claimed by the Tamils as their traditional homeland—was restored 
to the Sri Lankan state. For the majority Sinhalese population, this victory represented both 
the defeat of ‘terrorism’ and the re-conquest of land previously withheld from the unitary 
state structure. Total territorial control is necessitated by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
ideology, in which the collective imagination of nationhood is based on preserving and 
protecting the land for Buddhism and Buddhists. The post-war authorship of public space, 
this article argues, is a highly visible, symbolic and ideological effort to expand Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemony into Tamil-dominated regions and to suppress and erase Tamil 
nationalist sentiment. This article demonstrates how land policies, development and the 
tourism industry in a post-war context can go hand-in-hand with dispossession, militarisation 
and the humiliation of a ‘defeated’ minority community.  
This authorship of space is examined here as part of the state’s post-war nation-building 
strategy, a continuation of an historical process of Sinhala-Buddhist revival under 
colonialism and post Independence in 1948. As Jazeel and Brun argue, space is produced yet 
agentive.
1
 Space is meaningful; a politics of identity and power, of ethnicity and culture, is 
enacted through space. It is permeated by politics and history; it is also produced and 
reproduced through everyday negotiations and social encounters. To examine spatial 
practices and politics is to examine ‘the very fabric through which nationhood, identity and 
violence are produced’.2 The process of spatial authorship began with renewed vigour in 
Tamil areas post war, as the military victory of the Sri Lankan state forces and the persistence 
of a powerful anti-minority Sinhala-Buddhist rhetoric combined to legitimise and necessitate 
 the physical, social and cultural domination of the north-eastern provinces. A spatial analysis 
is not merely an ideological exercise. Space is part of a geometry of power and signification 
in which the material and ideological are co-constitutive.
3
 The end of the war has enabled the 
latest stage of a long-standing Sinhala-Buddhist settler-colonialism project that has oscillated 
between policies of subjugation, practices of terror and acts of extraordinary violence in order 
to produce a docile and pacified Tamil population.
4
  
In the ‘national story’ of the nation state, architecture and public space have an 
ideological function. This article critically analyses the construction, renovation and 
destruction of physical sites in Sri Lanka’s post-war context in order to illustrate the role of 
space and ‘mnemonic practices’ in the nation-building project underway and to articulate the 
historical continuity of this project.
5
 Nation-building in Sri Lanka’s post-colonial period has 
been both an ideological and a concrete, physical construction.
6
 This article reflects on the 
expansion of structures of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist hegemony into Tamil-dominated 
areas as vehicles of ideology, material bases for neo-liberal economic projects in the region 
and purveyors of permanent, entrenched militarisation. The process serves to physically 
inscribe the triumph of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism on the landscape, while the physical 
remnants of the LTTE’s brand of Tamil nationalism are erased.  
National memory—and consequently national sentiment—is open to construction, 
contestation, rupture and reordering. Until former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s electoral 
defeat in January 2015, spatial authorship and its various profits were designed to consolidate 
his government’s power and to generate political capital by authoring the military victory as a 
continuation of Sinhala-Buddhist mythico-history: the stories and events ‘remembered’ as a 
shared basis of peoplehood.
7
 The position of minorities in this story is precarious. The 
Rajapaksa Government was democratically overthrown in January 2015. Amarasuriya argues 
that the preoccupation with examining violence and dissent in Sri Lanka through the lens of 
 ethnicity and nationalism has meant that certain ‘less spectacular’ forms of democratic 
dissent and resistance have been overlooked; and indeed it was an unlikely alliance of the less 
spectacular that defeated Rajapaksa in both presidential and general elections in 2015.
8
 
However, violence in Sri Lanka has long taken ethnicised form and though the incoming 
president, Maithripala Sirisena, has indicated an intention to pursue reconciliation and 
address injustices faced by the Tamils (including the reversal of state-military land grabs
9
), 
concerns remain over his commitment to Sinhala-Buddhist power—the maintenance of a 
unitary and majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist order—and the limitations this might place on the 
extension of his promises of ‘good governance’ to minorities.10 Sirisena’s ministerial cabinet 
is largely made up of defectors from Rajapaksa’s power structure, he has repeatedly 
committed to maintaining the military’s tight control of the Tamil speaking regions and he 
has rejected Tamil demands for autonomy.
11
 Post-war dynamics demonstrate that the form of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as espoused by Rajapaksa today finds expression in attacks on 
minority livelihoods, land and physical security. Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has 
continually proven itself as a colonising force and the techniques of authorship observed in 
the post-war Northeast are neither new nor specifically targeted at the Tamil people. This 
article turns to recent attacks on Muslim space, property and bodies in the South to illustrate 
how contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is defined by violence towards minorities. 
The Tamil people have long conceptualised the struggle for self-determination as a 
response to Sinhalese colonisation and oppression.
12
 The colonial ordering of Sri Lanka’s 
territory transformed the island from relatively autonomous spatio-political units to a 
territorial colonial island and, post Independence, to an independent nation state within which 
the Tamils were reduced to a minority.
13
 The British colonial government not only produced 
Sri Lanka’s national space, carving out a single unitary political structure, but also 
hegemonised the notion of its territoriality.
14
 The geostrategic usefulness of Sri Lanka (then 
 Ceylon) as a single political unit gave rise to this colonial practice: Ceylon was transformed 
into a unified political territory within the British Empire and became subject to the 
exploitative practices of colonial capitalism.
15
 In the process, the British eliminated and 
subordinated indigenous political power and cultural identity and spatial structures, which 
were seen as obstructions to the achievement of particular colonial objectives.
16
 Historically, 
the Lankan kingdoms had been organised as self-sufficient, self-contained entities. The 
British reoriented Ceylon’s power and political authority to London, through the colonial port 
city of Colombo, and reorganised the island into a single administrative space.
17
 
On Independence, instead of the political system of kingdoms extant prior to 
colonisation, their populations received a single state, which the post-colonial political elite 
maintained in its pre-established structure.
18
 Statist geopolitical paradigms have since 
bolstered the state’s unitary structure, demonstrated by the support offered to the Sri Lankan 
state by major world powers in its battle against so-called ‘separatist terrorists’.19 As Anghie 
argues in his examination of imperialism, colonialism and international law, the 
establishment of an international system of sovereign states meant that a specific set of 
cultural practices were included to the exclusion of others, a process of creating order 
amongst political entities that drew on ideas of the civilised European and uncivilised non-
European world.
20
 Despite the claims of the nation state to a concept of sovereignty that 
privileges a particular political relationship and concept of power, sovereignty is a dynamic 
concept. A post-colonial perspective, as Cunneen argues, sees sovereignty in terms of 
multiplicity and decentres state power.
21
 While Sinhalese nationalists have relied on the 
dominant colonial constitutional discourse to maintain a unitary nation state,
22
 Tamil 
nationalists have rejected the naturalisation of this political unit, declaring the right to a 
separate state on the basis of their pre-colonial autonomy and ethnic nationhood. We can, I 
argue, understand the post-Independence period in terms of the violence of colonial 
 pacification.
23
 This violence took on extreme proportions in the devastating final months of 
the war in 2009.
24
   
 
The achievement of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony  
Sri Lanka’s president from 2005 to 2015—Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) politician 
Mahinda Rajapaksa—recalled the ‘unconquerable history’ of Sinhalese kings as he delivered 
a victory speech to Parliament in 2009, confirming the defeat of the LTTE and reminding the 
population of his electoral promise not only to defeat ‘terrorism’ but also to prevent 
separatism.
25
 His speech reflected what Fernando terms ‘the imagination of “re-conquest”’.26 
The Sinhala kings of the past, Rajapaksa enthused, ‘defeated enemy invasions and ensured 
our freedom’.27 Despite overseeing the growth in popularity of a Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism that represents Tamils as invaders and pollutants of a sacred island, Rajapaksa 
portrayed the Tamil-speaking people as beneficiaries of this freedom, defined by 
development of the region, and promised that a ‘northern spring’ would soon come.28   
The Sinhala nationalist project is reliant on the integrity of the territory as a unitary state. 
Since Independence, political expediency has compelled Sinhalese leaders to perform their 
ideological commitment to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, progressively contributing to 
exclusionary, anti-minority positioning and discursive and violent practices of nationalism 
that have continuously reproduced the social field. In response to the continuing Sinhala 
project of majoritarian nation-building, the Tamil people’s reification of the ‘homeland’ 
generated militancy in its defence: ‘Tamil resistance turned on the defence of this territorial 
space, and Sinhala domination on its denial and dismantling’.29 The Tamil nation-building 
project under the LTTE brought its own homogenising violence, epitomised by the LTTE’s 
forced exodus of the Muslim population from the Northern Province in 1990.
30
 The end of 
the war against the LTTE represented the apex of a contemporary and virulent Sinhala-
 Buddhist nationalism that Rajapaksa embodies and promotes.
31
 Rajapaksa’s bellicose 
coalition-building upon his election in 2005 capitalised both on Sinhala-Buddhist aspirations 
and the intensifying hostility to, and eventual collapse of, the liberal peace project and its 
Western ‘interference’ in Sri Lanka, which was epitomised by the 2002 peace process, 
including Norway’s involvement as facilitator and its group of international co-chairs (the 
US, the EU and Japan).
32
  
The liberal peace, as described by Richmond, is a model through which ‘Western-led 
agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under a hegemonic 
system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social, and economic 
systems’.33 As Nadarajah and Rampton argue, colonial and international (e.g. donor and 
international non-governmental organisation) efforts to bring about liberal social 
transformation through frameworks of development, economy, security and ethnic harmony 
have been always deeply interwoven with nationalist and racialised processes of state-
building, demographic re-engineering, securitised development and counter-insurgency.
34
 
The liberal peace model was compatible with Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism and the 
‘international community’ engaged enthusiastically with Sri Lanka as a fertile context for the 
‘liberal peace’—a promising, if yet incomplete, multi-ethnic liberal democracy with effective 
institutions and a neo-liberal economy.
35
 Attempts to ‘make peace and create order’ through 
the liberal peace have been written through with efforts by hegemonic international actors 
and institutions ‘to preserve their own value systems and to freeze the world’s cartographies 
in their favour’.36 The ‘violent, coercive and militarised character of a cosmetically pacific 
liberal order model’ has been laid bare in the ‘war on terror’ and interventionist action in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, for example.
37
  
While two forms of the liberal peace ran parallel in Sri Lanka’s peace process—both a 
democratising, development-focused model of liberal peace and a more militarised, 
 conservative model which prioritised the maintenance of existing normative and political 
hierarchies—the primary discourse surrounding the liberal peace and its implosion bolstered 
the nationalist imaginary of Sri Lanka’s ‘territorial integrity’ as explicitly Sinhala-Buddhist, 
mapping it onto the entire island. The project’s inherent focus on territorial boundaries and 
sovereignty served to undermine the principle of parity between the government and the 
LTTE, and worked to undermine and discredit Tamil claims to self-determination. When the 
liberal peace burnt out in Sri Lanka, its advocates were labelled as ‘traitors’ and LTTE 
supporters. The militaristic logic of the securitisation of Sri Lankan territorial integrity 
survived and Rajapaksa was elected on a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist platform promising a 
final, military solution.
38
  
The military victory—which came at the cost of mass killings of Tamil civilians and 
well-documented violations of international humanitarian law
39—brought the Sinhalese-
Buddhist state into existence. The end of the war was a conclusive defeat of the LTTE’s 
challenge to the unitary make-up of Sri Lanka. Rajapaksa was presented with a special 
honour by the Buddhist sangha (order of monks) in recognition of his success in reclaiming 
the entirety of the island for Sinhala-Buddhists.
40
 Post war, his vision merged nation and state 
and perpetuated the foundation myth of the Sinhala people: that ‘all other groups [...] are 
present merely as shadows, not as constitutive elements of a common political culture’.41 
  
Memory and space  
Memory is a significant site of struggle in Sri Lanka, one that is implicated in physical 
authorship of the land, displacement and dispossession, and is enforced through state 
violence and repression. The state-orchestrated consolidation of conflict memory is a feature 
of Sinhala-Buddhist nation-building that necessitates the (re)colonisation of Tamil land. The 
field of memory studies allows us to explore the ‘mechanisms of selection, narrativisation, 
 repression, displacement and denial’ as institutions and regimes that enforce history from 
above.
42
 Olick distinguishes between collective memory as a field of inquiry and ‘mnemonic 
practices’, where rituals and narratives are publicly performed,43 and Halbwachs describes 
collective memory as ‘the active past that forms our identities’, a shared memory that is 
collectively recalled, recognised, localised and reconstructed in a social process.
44
 While the 
state is often the dominant memory-maker, with resources to support the initiation of the 
national story, community rituals and practices can proffer possible strategies of cohesion and 
struggle,
45
 even—as for the Tamils—offering visions of nationhood against an overbearing 
state.
46
  
For the Sinhalese-dominated government and majority population, the end of the war 
was an ‘epic’ event47 and a ‘lieu de memoire’.48 It was an event mythologised as it occurred 
and invested with huge symbolic significance for the project of nation-building that lay 
ahead. Historic accounts of Sinhalese kings triumphing over Tamil invading forces flooded 
the public sphere. The Rajapaksa Government is credited with providing the closing chapter 
of Sinhalese mythico-history in the contemporary defeat of the ‘Tamils’—the LTTE. The 
term ‘community of memory’ befits a community that does not forget its past, one that retells 
its story as its ‘constitutive narrative’.49  Recognising that cultural symbolic tools are 
available to the state to enhance its power and authority,
50
 Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa 
Government moved to establish permanent symbols on the conquered land, symbols that 
serve to embed and promote the constitutive narrative of Sinhala-Buddhist national identity. 
As Olick and Robbins argue, ‘[m]emory sites and memory practices are central loci for 
ongoing struggles over identity’.51 These memory projects are symbols of domination that 
give rise to practical grievances for the Tamil people.   
 
The post-war Northeast  
 Post war, the territory that was formerly ruled by the LTTE as a de facto state is now heavily 
militarised by the Sri Lankan armed forces. Development and reconstruction programmes 
adhere to the logic of ‘Sinhalisation’ and tourist sites, the most obvious markers of memory-
making, have been established at structures formerly used by the LTTE and are run by the 
military.
52
 Development is ‘securitised’ and the state-corporate-military nexus is both 
nebulous and established.
53
 A range of authors have described the various means by which a 
‘war by other means’ is being waged against the Tamils in the post-war period: a war in 
which the weapons are socio-economic disempowerment, spatial oppression and 
militarisation, surveillance, intimidation and cultural intrusion in the service of Sinhala-
Buddhist homogenisation. These weapons are concealed in the rhetoric of transitional justice, 
national security and development.
54
  
The new features of this ‘war’ work in tandem with the continuation of colonial and 
post-colonial state practices of colonisation—the resettlement and ‘privileging’ of Sinhalese 
peasants that epitomises the potent nexus between Sinhala-Buddhism, the post-colonial state 
and development practices.
55
 The government is perceived to have a long-standing plan to 
change the ethnic composition of those areas, thereby undermining Tamil separatist claims.
56
 
The post-war ‘Sinhalisation’ of the Northeast has included military and unofficial civilian 
settlements, neo-liberal development and the construction of Buddhist religious structures to 
cater to Sinhalese military personnel, Sinhalese tourists and Buddhist pilgrims.
57
 The site of 
the final stage of the war—a site of mass atrocities perpetrated against the Tamil people—has 
been transformed into a place of triumphalism and religious conviction with the construction 
of a military monument and a Buddhist stupa.
58
 Military renovations of neglected Buddhist 
monasteries have sometimes been followed by Sinhala settlements, showcasing the link 
between the military, Buddhism and colonisation.
59
  
 ‘Sinhalisation’ encompasses occupation by the overwhelmingly Sinhalese army, 
demographic change by settling Sinhalese families in the North, renaming roads and areas in 
the Sinhalese language and building Buddhist stupas in traditionally Hindu or Christian 
areas—physical landmarks that support the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist project.60 The 
naming of roads is also merged with Sinhala-Buddhist military triumphalism: in 
Kaṉakārayaṉkuḷam, for example, two roads have been named after soldiers who took part in 
the war, and another is named after a Buddhist monk.
61
 Sinhalisation, in short, is the 
production of a post-Independence national identity marked ethnically as Sinhalese and 
religiously as Buddhist. The process naturalises the Sinhala-Buddhist character of space, and 
minoritises Tamil, Muslim and non-Sinhala difference. As elegantly asserted by Tariq Jazeel, 
the process simultaneously naturalises and ethnicises the fabric of the national in 
contemporary Sri Lanka.
62
 Examining these interconnected alterations to the landscape 
through the framework of memory studies allows for an understanding of how the state’s 
hegemonic authorship of space is pursued.  
The post-war expansion of Sinhala-Buddhist state memory projects into the Tamil-
dominated region is intrinsically interwoven with trade and commerce. As noted by Woost 
and Winslow, development can ‘open up new spaces for violence and political manipulation 
as new resources become the object of desire up and down the hierarchy of agency’.63 The 
military, Sinhalese business people from the South, and international capital have 
appropriated post-war spaces of ‘development’ to attain control of the resources of the 
Northern Province.
64
 The ‘post-war reconstruction’ propagated by the state has excluded 
thousands of displaced Tamil families from new housing and construction projects and 
deprived them of their land through a legally dubious process of land acquisition.
65
 The 
creation of ‘High Security Zones’ (HSZ) and ‘Economic Development Zones’ that block 
access to land and sea, and the military’s involvement in economic life, undermine crucial 
 forms of livelihood and food security.
66
 The economic system in the post-war Northeast 
displays ethnocratic inclinations: the system facilitates ethnic control of power and resources, 
for example by issuing fishing licences to Southern, Sinhalese fishermen and not local 
Tamils.
67
 As a community profile report on the village of Passaiyoor East in Jaffna makes 
clear, foreign money, in the form of diaspora remittances, have kept local economies afloat in 
the absence of state assistance.
68
 State professions of secular and equitable development are 
intended to veil the return of colonisation, as state land acquisition deliberately targets and 
dispossesses the Tamil and Muslim communities.
69
 While these dynamics are not observed in 
all regions of the North, where many military and navy camps and HSZ have been 
dismantled,
70
 as Fernando describes, key public and economic locations have been occupied. 
Under the ‘gloss and spin’ of the current development strategy, we are seeing a return to the 
militarised, highly nationalistic colonisation of old.
71
  
Infrastructure itself is deployed in a rhetoric of development that reinforces and 
reproduces a powerful Sinhalese nationalism,
72
 a rhetoric that perpetuates the colonial and 
post-Independence logic of the unitary state in the contemporary context. Militarisation is 
also at the centre of development. The employment and deployment of soldiers is justified in 
the post-conflict phase by the forces’ involvement in development work. The state claims that 
the huge task of reconstructing the Northern Province can only be handled by the military: a 
disciplined, efficient and uncorrupted institution.
73
 Since May 2009, the state forces have 
forcibly occupied more than 7,000 square kilometres (37 per cent) of the land owned by the 
Tamil people of the North.
74
 Though the state’s post-war reconciliation mechanism, the 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC),
75
 identified the establishment and 
maintenance of ‘High Security Zones’ as detrimental to reconciliation and the achievement of 
justice for the Tamil population displaced from their local areas, the post-war trend has been 
to consolidate the militarisation of the Northeast. The military’s security function, according 
 to Tamil activists, is now engaged on behalf of Sinhalese settlers.
76
 The militarisation of the 
area facilitates and securitises a process of development and reconstruction that is consistent 
with historical claims of ‘a rampant form of demographic engineering, through colonisation 
and administrative and electoral changes’.77 This economic-military nexus operates to 
facilitate the ‘re-conquest’ of Tamil areas, a process that also operates in the service of a 
Sinhala-Buddhist reordering of the landscape. 
At the centralised, administrative level, land alienation policies under the Land 
Acquisition Act contribute to political forms of ethnic and religious repression: minority 
communities are politically and materially marginalised. As an ex-civil servant of the 
Department of Tea and Plantations stated, ‘this new land alienation policy is simply granting 
legal status to a modern wave of land grabs, plundering of our resources and exploitation of 
cheap labour’.78 The logic of national security, normalised militarisation and Sinhalese 
settlement is redesigning the local landscape and depriving many local people of their land. 
In a comprehensive report, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) describes a ‘disturbing 
trend’ in the post-war administration of land: the dominant role of the central government and 
military actors.
79
 The CPA concludes that the state regularly acts outside the parameters of 
the Land Acquisition Act and distorts the purpose of the Act, which requires that private land 
only be taken where it is for a ‘public purpose’. The centralised administration of land is a 
powerful tool in the hands of the colonising state.  
The 13
th
 Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution established the Provincial Council 
system as a result of the Indo-Lanka Accord 1987: a mechanism of power decentralisation 
aiming to facilitate a political solution to the conflict. The devolution of land and police 
powers to the Northern Provincial Council, however, has never been implemented. The 
question of land administration has been hotly contested since the election of a Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA)-dominated Northern Provincial Council in September 2013, as this 
 local administrative mechanism has demanded greater autonomy in the face of the 
government’s injurious land acquisition policies. The question of land powers under the 13th 
Amendment came before the Supreme Court in June 2013. The Court ruled that state land 
was vested in the central government and not the provincial councils, five days after citizens 
of the Northern Province polled overwhelmingly in favour of greater autonomy for the 
region.
80
 Land policies are often weaponised as a tool of minority oppression in an 
ethnocratic state. Termed the ‘hidden oppressor’ by Oren Yiftachel, land policies carry the 
weight of legality and are discursively framed as legitimate and necessary.
81
  
The geopolitical significance of the Northern Province is also a pertinent issue in 
considering the transfer of land and power to the ethnic majority.
82
 The unitary Sri Lankan 
state established under colonial rule, now as then, holds strategic military importance. 
Whereas under colonial rule, this state formation benefitted the British Empire and colonial 
capitalism, under the current geopolitical world system, Sri Lanka’s strategic weight in the 
region is dependent on centralised control of the Northeast. ‘High Security Zones’ have long 
been established to secure strategic military bases and industries in the Northeast. This 
geostrategic/statist interest is intimately bound up with the oppression and dispossession of 
the Tamil people, just as the Sinhala-Buddhist character of the territory is confirmed by the 
wholeness of the state. For example, one HSZ established in 1990 dominates the Jaffna 
peninsula in Valikamam North, including Myliddy harbour, and 9,905 Tamil families were 
displaced from this area, including local fishermen.
83
 In Mullikulam, an informal HSZ has 
seen the establishment of a naval base, rendering nearly 1,000 acres of land and five 
irrigation tanks inaccessible to farmers.
84
 Demonstrating the interconnection between 
security, militarism and state-corporate development, some expanses of land in the Northeast 
were initially declared as HSZs only to be later re-gazetted as ‘Special Economic Zones’, 
such as Sampur in Trincomalee, where the construction of a coal power plant is imminent.
85
 
 In order to understand the ideological genesis of this Sinhalisation and Buddhicisation of the 
Northeast, the following section offers an explanatory discussion of Sri Lankan 
historiography and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.  
 
Sri Lanka: historiography and nationalism  
In Sri Lanka, as Elizabeth Nissan asserts, ‘history is at once the stuff of culture and the stuff 
of conflict’.86 From the nineteenth century, the Sinhalese past was re-examined by Sinhalese 
and Western scholars and filtered through colonial historicism: the British formal excavation 
and authorisation of knowledge in Sri Lanka shaped a ‘new kind of history’.87 The radical 
reconstitution of the Sinhalese and Tamil groups in the course of this process transformed the 
social and political landscape in Sri Lanka. Until the nineteenth century, European accounts 
of documented history in Sri Lanka stated that no existing texts could be considered as 
history.
88
 The island was, however, considered rich in myth and superstition.
89
 In 1830, the 
Buddhist Chronicles, the Mahavamsa, and its commentaries were ‘excavated’ by colonial 
historians, read as a chronological narrative and held to reach the threshold of 
historiographical truth. The Mahavamsa ‘exercised the British imagination greatly’.90 The 
text was distorted and subjected to ‘violent transformations’ in translation from Pāḷi to 
English.
91
 In the process of editing, the translator, George Turnour, was selective in 
suppressing and rejecting passages that he thought incoherent or ‘fantastical’; these passages 
were simply cut out in order to facilitate the chronological narrative sought.
92
 In this way, 
‘history’ was constructed: a colonial narrativisation of the past.93  
Today’s Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is based on the authenticity of the Mahavamsa 
and its territorial claims, which informs the Sinhalese imaginary of Sri Lanka the nation state 
belonging entirely to Sinhala-Buddhists.
94
 It is a key text in nationalist readings of the 
island’s history, a history that conveniently supported the strategic colonial structuring of the 
 state as a single political unit. Yet when Turnour translated the text, he had ‘never yet met 
with a native who had critically read through, and compared their several historical works, or 
who had, til lately, seen a commentary on the Mahavamse [sic]’.95 Elite Sinhalese revival 
activists, Nissan argues, relied on the colonial resurrection of the Sinhalese past
96
 and 
naturalised the territorial entity of Sri Lanka just as they internalised the racialised language 
by which difference was constructed between the Tamils and the Sinhalese as they developed 
nationalist ideologies and construed resistance to colonialism. In the pursuit of national 
identity in the immediate post-colonial period, emphasis was placed on the exclusive Sinhala 
claim to history and ‘national’ territory, now reliant on the nation state framework. Tamils 
were represented as ‘Indian invaders’, a force threatening to erode Sinhala identity. Sri 
Lankan nation-building was founded on colonial knowledge production: a process of 
interpretation, selection and suppression of histories that set racialised collectives against one 
another within the one unitary state.  
Under colonialism, the ‘imaginative ordering of the island’s collective identity’ was 
intimately associated with a reordering of the landscape: regions were amalgamated and 
roads were built to facilitate the administration of a centralised state and its plantation 
economy and to service Sinhalese settlements.
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 With the British Empire’s conquering of Sri 
Lanka, Fernando argues, another conquest by the Sinhala-Buddhists was being set in motion 
against Tamils and Muslims. This project involved Sinhala encroachment onto land 
traditionally occupied by the Tamil people in colonial and post-Independence colonisation 
projects that have relocated Sinhalese settlers to Sri Lanka’s Dry Zone, which includes the 
Tamil-dominated Northeast. This colonisation was discursively and proudly associated with 
‘a return to the ancient irrigation civilisation of the Sinhalese’.98 In the context of rising 
tensions and conflict between Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan Government in the 1990s, 
the ‘unstable borderlands’ and irrigation projects of the state were securitised through 
 militarised colonisation, often funded through foreign aid that supported state-directed 
colonisation in an ever more aggressive manner.
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 This security function, again, stabilised the 
statist framework within which Sri Lanka found its place in the international order.  
 
Conflict memorials and the authorship of space  
Soldiers are building all sorts of monument hailing the victory of the 
government and the army over the Tamil Tigers. For locals, they are a symbol 
of their domination, also because no one is allowed to build anything to 
commemorate Tamil war dead.
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Commemoration through the medium of the memorial and the ritual was a well-established 
enterprise within nation-building projects over the course of the war, both for the LTTE and 
the Sinhalese-dominated state. Prior to their military defeat, the LTTE’s commemorative 
activities centred on martyrs’ cemeteries and memorials dedicated to the ‘Great Heroes’, 
rituals, Tiger iconography and nationalistic songs.
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 The state set up the statutorily supported 
Rana Viru Seva Authority in 2000, a public body for the allocation of funds for ‘war heroes’ 
projects, including the construction of memorials and memorial parks and the organisation of 
activities commemorating War Heroes Day on 7 June each year.
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 Neloufer de Mel’s 
analysis of the Sri Lankan state’s shifting commemorative priorities emphasises that 
memorials require financial support and political patronage.
103
 State-sponsored ‘mnemonic 
practices’ are strategic and highly political; they are mechanisms by which national stories 
are produced that serve the political elite in nation-building processes.
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Memorials for war heroes are prominent and public embodiments of Sinhala-Buddhist 
national identity and vehicles of collective memory based on that identity. Historically for the 
state, the purpose of war memorials has been to inculcate a sense of national unity and 
identity, to rally support for the centralised government.
105
 In memorials for fallen Sinhalese 
 soldiers, the ‘ideas, passions and energies’ of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism are manifested 
‘in an orchestrated fashion with performatic precision’.106 Soldiers are portrayed as 
‘guardians and protectors of the geo-physical and political integrity of the nation-state and 
Sinhala selfhood: a clear overlap between the identity of the state and the Sinhalese’.107 
Drawing on the ‘hazy vistas of the Sinhala collective past where history and myth 
intermingle’, the heroic acts and sacrifices of soldiers in the war against the LTTE became 
sacred Sinhala duties: Buddhist duties to preserve the island for Buddhism.
108
 In the post-
conflict memorials, the ‘heroism’ of the Sri Lankan state forces in the final battle against the 
LTTE is woven into a narrative of centuries of Sinhalese soldiers acting as guardians of a 
unitary Sri Lanka, defending the island from Tamil invasions.  
The enormous and hyper-visible state memorials in the Northern Province are built with 
the purpose of broadcasting the formidable strength and success of the armed forces; they 
valorise martial values of sacrifice and courage rather than lament civilian or military losses. 
The Puthukkudiyiruppu victory monument, unveiled on 12 October 2009, is an apt 
example.
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 The memorial is located at an important strategic impasse where much of the 
heavy fighting took place at the end of the war. The torso of a jubilant soldier, waving a Sri 
Lankan flag in one hand and raising a rifle in the other, is surrounded by concrete lions on 
each corner—the symbol of the Sinhalese race, which also features as the centrepiece of the 
national flag. Interpreting the monument’s ideological function, we see the lions as protectors 
of the venerated soldier. The monument pays homage to the soldier who triumphed in his 
mission to defend the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese. Mnemonic practices 
are tightly bound up with establishing and naturalising the unitary structure of the state. 
Circumstances following an event, disaster or ‘upheaval’ often require that resources and 
energies are devoted elsewhere; commemorative practices such as the construction of 
memorials occur when resources are available.
110
 In Sri Lanka, memorials were given 
 primary priority and constructed very quickly following the end of the war, despite the great 
need of the civilian population languishing in ‘welfare villages’ (more appropriately 
described as detention camps) in horrendous conditions.
111
 The state was quick to author the 
landscape with symbols of Sinhala-Buddhist national sentiment and militaristic triumph. 
Crisis Group notes that the construction of these monuments interferes with the cultural rights 
of the Tamil population and inflicts further damage on state-Tamil and inter-community 
relations.
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 The memorials illustrate the inscription of Sri Lankan ‘oneness’ on the 
landscape, despite the resistant nationalism of the Tamil inhabitants of the Northeast. The war 
memorials are interpreted by the Tamil community and its diasporas as ‘Sinhalese 
monuments of victory and subjugation’ that have replaced Tamil historical monuments and 
graveyards and now form part of ‘a new topography of terror’.113 Fernando provides a near-
exhaustive list of instances where the Sri Lankan military has destroyed, occupied or 
prevented the renovation of sites of religious importance for the Tamil people.
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Acts of memorialisation, Amarasingam and Hyndman observe, are often inseparable 
from reconstruction initiatives and broader political issues.
115
 Critical analysis of the 
‘construction, selection, placement, and prominence’ of landmarks reveals much about ‘the 
victor’s nationalist project as well as the continuing struggle for power’.116 With the rise of 
the nation state, the necessity of a common past as well as a common future emerged as a key 
requirement in the process of ‘nation-building’.117 The authorship of physical space is central 
to consolidating a common past. It is symbolic that Sri Lankan soldiers in the post-war period 
are increasingly involved in memory work as well as ‘development’ work. State officials 
describe how the armed forces are literally building the new Sri Lanka, constructing 
memorials and Buddhist stupas and working on infrastructure and housing projects.
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 The 
Sinhalese-dominated army that defended the nation from terrorist destruction is physically 
carving out the ‘reborn’ Sri Lankan nation. This authorship, of course, involves erasure of 
 what was there before. It is part of the government’s strategy of reordering newly conquered 
land and people:  
to crush and dismantle any physical manifestations of a long history of [Tamil] 
dissent and resistance. By erasing the physical remains of our past, our present 
becomes destabilized and vulnerable to distortion, obfuscation and negation.
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A particularly striking feature of the post-war authorship process is the ‘re-discovery’ of 
ancient religious and historical sites of Sinhala-Buddhist import in Tamil-dominated areas, 
described by Adnan as ‘a state sponsored rewriting of history, re-categorising, [...] re-
territorialising’.120 The influx of archaeological teams to the Northern Province since the end 
of the war has furthered the Sinhala-Buddhist state’s project of undermining the concept of a 
traditional, historic homeland of Tamil Eelam. For example, a 2013 study carried out by the 
Department of Archaeology found ‘recently discovered archaeological sites showing 
evidence of Buddhism in Mullaitivu district’.121 Out of 87 sites examined by the study—
accessible only in the post-war period—42 sites revealed the evidence of Buddhism. 
Academics such as Peter Schalk have long drawn attention to the historical existence of 
Tamil Buddhists.
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The existence of Buddhist artefacts in Tamil-dominated areas does not necessarily prove 
that Sinhala-Buddhists previously ruled the region, as nationalists declare. As one activist 
told Minority Rights Group, ‘[i]n Sri Lanka there has always been Tamil Buddhism [...] Now 
they are trying to Sinhalize all of this and they don’t acknowledge Tamil Buddhism’.123 
Further, Tamil human rights activists are sceptical of the authenticity of these sites, 
publicising complaints by local people that ‘Sinhala Buddhist archaeologists are engaged in 
nefarious activities of Sinhalization’, visiting Tamil areas and ‘excavating’ Buddha statues 
that they themselves had planted earlier.
124
 Minority Rights Group interviewed people in 
Trincomalee in the Eastern Province who insisted that they saw state officials and police 
 partaking in the nocturnal planting of artefacts.
125
 While these archaeological findings may or 
may not be authentic, they are politically appropriated in the service of Sinhala-Buddhist 
domination, justifying the ‘re-conquest’ of the region by reference to an ancient past. 
Tellingly, former President Rajapaksa appointed a Sinhala-Buddhist monk as the curator for 
the archaeological sites and artefacts in the Jaffna peninsula.
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Authoring ancient architecture  
The state’s strategic authorship of space is not a new phenomenon in Sri Lanka. Scholars 
have examined processes of nationalistic authorship in relation to the ancient and sacred sites 
of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Sri Pada and Kataragama.
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 These scholars show how the 
post-colonial state excavated and renovated ‘sacred places’ such as temples and ancient sites 
in order to construct the ‘nationalist consciousness’ of Sinhala-Buddhism. The colonial 
‘conjunction of European historical imaginings and local chronicle histories’ altered the 
meaning of sacred sites.
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 The process of authorship by which sacred sites were reconfigured 
into (Sinhala-)Buddhist sites in the post-colonial period were directed by both state actors and 
individual, non-state activists.
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 This process is illustrative of the diffusion and enforcement 
of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony through various public and private apparatuses. The physical 
authorship of territory is both politically symbolic and a practical violation of rights: 
minorities have been excluded and displaced from private land and sites of worship. 
Crucially, the authorship of these sites in contemporary history is a not a post-colonial 
restoration: it represents ‘a manifestation of current ideas about an ancient past and its 
relation to the present’.130 
Casting a critical eye over historical accounts in Sri Lanka, Pradeep Jegananthan 
highlights the linkages made ‘crudely and unselfconsciously’ between the Mahavamsa’s 
history of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation and current day society and politics.
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 In his analysis 
 of the ruins of the Kingdom of Anuradhapura (founded in 377 BC), Jegananthan 
demonstrates how the conflicts between Sinhalese kings and ‘invading Tamils’ are contained 
in ‘micro-historical narratives’ at each particular ruin site. Recounted by the site’s historical 
information notices, ethnic antagonism is inscribed on the landscape; the ruins of the 
desecrated kingdom are said to bear the scars of assaults by the Tamils. The site’s dilapidated 
majesty and sophistication is presented as evidence of the former glory of the Sinhala-
Buddhist nation, a glory perpetually under siege by the Tamils. The ruins are a physical 
symbol of both Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy and historical victimisation. E. Valentine Daniel 
notes that Anuradhapura has become a victim of the ‘gaze’ of historians and 
archaeologists.
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 At the site, tour guides take on the task of interpretation and repeat the 
mythico-history of the Sinhala-Buddhist past. 
The physical remnants of Anuradhapura are understood by the Sinhalese as symbols of 
ancient greatness, a national sovereignty that stands ready to be re-established in the present 
day. This royal and religious centre was threatened by Tamil invasion and ‘lost’ under 
colonialism; it was swallowed by the jungle and emptied of people. Since Independence, it 
has been redeemed and returned to its ‘pristine’ state, reasserted under Sinhala-Buddhist 
rulers as the heartland of a Buddhist nation.
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 The ‘apparent inevitability’ of the ruins’ return 
to greatness confirms that Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony is the natural state of the Sri Lankan 
nation.
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 The Tamil ‘other’ is the disruptive presence in this continuity. The violation and 
subsequent abandonment of the sites feeds into the defensive nationalism that makes up the 
core of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology; the threat to the Sinhala race is signified by the ruined 
condition of these ancient sites.
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 A Sinhalese duty to protect the sites from the Tamils 
connects their purported historical efforts to corrupt the sacred Buddhist character of the land 
with contemporary separatist aspirations. History is projected on the contemporary moment 
 and the battle against the LTTE is framed as the final scene in the epic saga that stretches 
back to the glory of Anuradhapura.  
Nissan’s analysis of the ‘ancient city’ of Anuradhapura’s post-colonial redevelopment 
explains how the site was excavated, reordered and authored by successive Sinhala 
majoritarian governments. It was both a source of political legitimacy for politicians, whose 
conservation and regeneration efforts enhanced their Sinhala-Buddhist credentials, and a site 
of individual Buddhist and decolonial activism. Under the auspices of Buddhist activist 
Brahmacary Walisinghe Harischandra, who pursued a relentless campaign to ‘win 
Anuradhapura back for the Buddhists’, Anuradhapura was reconfigured as an exclusionary, 
Buddhist-only ancient site.
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 The wider process of ‘Buddhicisation’ has rendered certain 
sites sacred and inaccessible to ‘outsider’ minorities. Sites have been closed to traditional 
Hindu, Christian and Muslim pilgrimage routes, disrupting cultural patterns of behaviour and 
modes of being, and marketed as tourist attractions exclusively in accordance with their 
Buddhist history.
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 Thus, the Sinhalese majoritarian ideology, with its intimate connection to 
Buddhism, is claimed as the ‘correct’ history of the place. 
This process of authorship is continued in contemporary Sri Lanka. In the post-war 
Northeast, as described below, the project has hastened. Daniel analyses the story of the 
ancient city of Polonnaruwa as the ‘ontic centre of rising Sinhala nationalism’.138 
Polonnaruwa, he argues, was ‘historicised’ by colonising Europeans: the site became a 
‘discovery’ and a ‘museum’. The Kataragama temple—historically a predominantly Hindu 
pilgrimage site—was re-authored as an exclusively Buddhist site in the mid-twentieth 
century.
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 The hegemonisation or ‘Buddhicisation’ of sacred sites is often achieved ‘with 
maximum use of state power and resources’, though other examples of Buddhist reordering 
such as Sri Pāda and Kelaniya occurred without state sponsorship.140 The diffusion of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism into society ensured participation in the ‘“national 
 regeneration” project that would have a dominant, devastating impact on post-colonial Sri 
Lankan politics’.141 Sri Pāda’s predominantly Buddhist nature was established during a 
‘restoration’ or ‘reordering project’ undertaken by the Chief Priest Dhammānanda from 1954 
to 1970.
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 Though religious rituals at Sri Pāda were diverse, Dhammānanda restricted non-
Buddhist participation at the temple site, reducing non-Buddhists to onlookers. The Kelaniya 
temple, similarly, was reconstituted as a popular place of Buddhist worship not under state 
patronage but due to the ideological and monetary influence of Colombo’s wealthy 
Wijewardene family. The temple became a site of important religious and political activity in 
post-colonial Sri Lanka.
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Mahinda Rajapaksa and authorship of ancient sites  
The popularity of the Rajapaksa Government hinged largely on the destruction of the LTTE; 
the war facilitated the consolidation of national identity on Sinhala-Buddhist principles. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the historical episode recalled in reference to the end of 
the war in 2009 is the Mahavamsa’s account of the battle between the Sinhala King 
Dutugemunu (who reigned from 161 BC to 137 BC) and the ‘invading Tamil’ Prince Elara 
from India’s Chola Kingdom. The continuity between the ancient battle and the defeat of the 
LTTE in 2009 was recognised in popular discourse. Flattering comparison between 
Dutugemunu and Mahinda Rajapaksa served as a powerful populist tool.
144
 The echoes of 
mythology cemented support for the government and bolstered majoritarian consent for a 
military solution to the conflict. Government-issued billboards and pro-government television 
advertisements where Rajapaksa stood proudly in a formation of ancient Sinhala kings made 
explicit the connection.
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 In Dutugemunu’s time, ‘[t]he victory of the king was a victory 
over Tamils’.146 The echoes of the past in the present day reinforced Rajapaksa’s popularity 
and power.  
 The past was not echoed, however, in the commemorative arrangements of the 
respective Sinhalese leaders. The triumphant Dutugemunu ordered a monument to be built 
for the defeated Elara, and buried him below. As a mark of respect, the people were directed 
to bow to the monument when passing.
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 In contrast, Sri Lankan army sources stated that the 
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s remains would be buried in a mass grave, along with 
all the LTTE fighters killed in the final phase of the war. The official position was that the 
‘psychopathic leader of world’s most barbaric terrorist outfit’ ought to be treated in death 
‘like any other terrorist’.148 A mass burial would ‘prevent any sort of hero worship or 
memorial being built in the honour of Prabhakaran’.149 Military spokesperson Brigadier 
Udaya Nayayakkara confirmed: ‘We did not want anything that people could use to 
remember him. He should not be remembered as a martyr’.150 The physical presence of his 
remains would add a more meaningful dimension to any site of remembrance or 
veneration.
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The Sri Lankan state has struggled to suppress public commemoration of the LTTE since 
2009 and has deployed the military in Jaffna town on successive Maveerar Naal—Heroes’ 
Day, 27 November—the LTTE’s annual day of remembrance for fallen fighters.152 The 
LTTE predicted apocalyptic visions of defeat and destruction by the Sinhalese state in order 
to consolidate support, presenting itself as the only viable protector of the Tamil people.
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The end of the war has proven this catastrophic prediction to be true: Tamils have suffered 
mass death, prolonged detention in camps and post-war socio-economic and political 
abjectness. Aware of the persistent symbolic dimension of physical structures, the triumphant 
state forces destroyed LTTE monuments and buried graveyards under the concrete of Sri 
Lankan army camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Army structures now dominate 
and possess the bodies of LTTE cadres that represented the ‘seeds’ of separatism.154 Physical 
reordering is a technique designed to decimate organised resistance and separatist ideology, 
 communicating to the Tamil people that unity in Sri Lankan nationhood is the only political 
future. The construction of these monuments is a violent act of colonisation and domination: 
a crucial symbolic element of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist encroachment into Tamil territory. 
Conflict memory is authored by the state as the entity with the ‘power and the ability to 
dictate reality’.155 These physical changes, Perera argues, indicate how insecure Sri Lanka’s 
nationhood has become, where political opponents must be ‘razed and vaporized from the 
face of the earth, and history’.156  
 
War tourism: commodifying the war, marketing ideology  
While LTTE graveyards and monuments were destroyed post war, certain parts of the LTTE 
infrastructure became a hive of tourist activity. The selective destruction, construction, 
showcasing and appropriation of physical sites is revealing in terms of the state’s selective 
remembering and consolidation of a favourable conflict narrative.
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 Curious Sinhalese 
people from Southern villages (many of whom have family members in state military 
employment) rent private tour buses and travel collectively to the final sites of conflict in the 
Northern Province.
158
 The buses take tourists to Prabhakaran’s home, to the LTTE-run prison 
complexes and to the LTTE’s offices of administration. Although official tours are not 
organised by the state, soldiers guide predominantly Sinhalese visitors on the ‘terrorism tour’ 
and offer a state-sanctioned narrative of events.
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 All signboards erected for the purposes of 
guiding the tourists are in Sinhalese and English, though the tours take place in a Tamil-
dominated area.
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 Investigative journalism has problematised the establishment of an LTTE 
museum and militarily guided tours in the Northern Province as economic exploitation of the 
Sinhalese ‘morbid curiosity in the defeated enemy’.161 Kim Wall’s photographic account in 
Al-Jazeera offers insight into the state’s authorship of LTTE machinery and infrastructure. 
 Capturing a scene featuring a group of Sinhalese tourists surveying the scale of the Sea Tiger 
swimming pool, Wall quotes the sign:  
While the nation was swarming with pools of blood with the spate of LTTE’s 
heinous crimes elsewhere, the terrorist had constructed this huge swimming 
pool in 2001 for exclusive use of the cream of terrorists.
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This statement captures the state’s portrayal of the LTTE as bloodthirsty, self-serving 
and apolitical, obstinate in its pursuit of war over peace. Amarasingam and Hyndman observe 
that Prabhakaran’s name is rarely mentioned—erasing his name from the post-war lexicon, it 
is substituted for titles such as ‘the terrorist leader’.163 Wall’s work includes a rare image of 
the interior of Prabhakaran’s family home. The army demolished the house in 2013, leaving 
commentators to speculate that the destruction was strategic, rather than on the basis of 
‘safety concerns’: ‘to prevent the site from becoming a shrine’.164 The LTTE bunkers 
themselves have now been destroyed as military officials preach the importance of laying the 
‘ghosts of terrorism’ to rest.165 
In post-conflict and post-atrocity settings, governing powers often draw on museum 
spaces and ‘historical’ tours as zones of evidence and authoritative explanation, seeking to 
enhance both popular national unity and international sympathy that elicits material 
assistance.
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 Daniel contends that the ‘theatrics’ performed at historical sites are enhanced 
by the demands of tourism.
167
 Just as tour guides at the ancient site of Anuradhapura 
reproduce the mythico-history of Sinhala-Buddhism, the state-military authorship of LTTE 
sites promotes the contemporary narrative of Sinhala supremacy, predestined territorial 
integrity and the defeat of ‘terrorists’. The military tours are designed to legitimise and 
glorify the actions of the state forces, and to promote the popularity of the military in order to 
naturalise militarisation.
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 The sophistication of the operation’s infrastructure serves to 
 emphasise the LTTE’s military strength, celebrating the state’s triumph over a formidable 
enemy and justifying the force used at the end of the war.  
To showcase the ‘defeat of terrorism’ as a consumable product in an economy reliant on 
tourism, physical traces of the LTTE’s infrastructure are maintained and displayed. Gillis 
warns of the results of commodification and commercialisation of memory.
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 Public 
institutions of ‘history’ such as museums and official guided tours of battlegrounds offer a 
narrative delivered in the service of power. They are sites of ideological control and often, as 
in the Sri Lankan case, denigration of political adversaries. Far from the state discourse of 
reconciliation, the institutionalisation of a ‘history’ based on Sinhala supremacy and Tamil 
‘terrorism’ is a violent interpretation, designed to justify and glorify the enormous violence 
perpetrated against the Tamil people, and promote the Rajapaksa Government as war heroes. 
Crucially, also, tourism in a recent war zone is a way to further militarise civilian space 
during peacetime. The state’s selective remembering of the LTTE—curated in tourist sites—
fuels a triumphalist Sinhala nationalism, reproduces the LTTE as a viable future threat and, 
as a result, ‘provides grounds for ongoing militarization of civilian spaces by the state and 
marginalization of Tamils and other minority groups in the country who are represented as 
latent threats’.170  
Sri Lanka’s state-military-corporate nexus is manifest in the development of tourist 
resorts and hotels in the Northeast. The state’s neo-colonial programme of expansion into 
Tamil areas combines rapid progress in the tourism industry with normalised militarisation 
and permanent displacement of local Tamils. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s 2012 election manifesto, 
Mahinda Chinthana, identified tourism as a key driver of post-war socio-economic 
development;
171
 the state-military complex moved rapidly to build up the industry’s capacity. 
As affirmed by Commander of the Army Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya, the army has 
been ‘spear heading the nation building effort of the government in the post conflict period’. 
 Thus, the army felt ‘obliged to align its resources in the leisure sector’ in order to contribute 
to Sri Lanka’s tourism policy goals.172 Deepening militarisation and tourism projects are co-
constitutive. The gains from tourism are benefiting the state and military as owner-investors 
and not the local Tamil population. 
The military owns a range of hotels and resorts catering to both military personnel and 
the public. This is marketed by the military as ‘another landmark in the sphere of Army 
welfare while contributing simultaneously to Sri Lanka’s growing hotel industry in a 
competitive manner, to coincide with the country’s forward-march to be the “Miracle of 
Asia”’.173 In 2012, the army launched its own resort brand, Laya—a Sanskrit word that 
means rest and repose.
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 The tourism industry increasingly provides employment for Sri 
Lanka’s swollen forces—a huge military with no war to fight—and the profits of all these 
tourism endeavours are directed to the ‘enhancement of welfare projects of soldiers’.175 
Military-run tourism projects register on a spectrum of harm caused to the Tamil 
population, ranging from insensitivity to outright dispossession: sites of importance to the 
Tamil nationalist cause have been destroyed and the land on which many of these structures 
are built is private land occupied by the military and acquired by the state, relegating its 
rightful owners to prolonged displacement and dispossession.
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 The Lagoon’s Edge hotel in 
Mullaitivu, for example, overlooks the site of the final battle with the LTTE and the hotel is 
marketed to Sinhalese tourists wishing to ‘bask in the afterglow of the battlefield’ where the 
military defeated the Tiger ‘terrorists’.177 The John Keells Group Resort in Chaaddi on Kayts 
Island is allegedly being built on land where an LTTE memorial formerly stood; the military 
sold this land to the corporation rather than return it to its local resident owners.
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Thalsevana Resort in Kakasanutharai, Jaffna, is situated on a 6,000 acre High Security Zone: 
land confiscated by the army on the grounds of national security.
179
 The area’s fisherman 
inhabitants were expelled without compensation in the early 1990s so that the military could 
 build a naval base. These fishermen are some of the 1,474 petitioners in a pending case 
against the government, who are challenging the continuing occupation of their land.
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The acquisition and development of land in the Northeast serves corporate interests and 
the state-military economic project. In the process, tourism celebrates the defeat of 
‘terrorism’, erases the physical traces of Tamil nationalist ideology and secures the ‘oneness’ 
of the Sri Lankan state. The process dispossesses the people, cuts off their livelihood 
resources, and also seals off areas where mass graves are suspected to exist. Mullaitivu, for 
example, the site of the final battle, is currently being developed as a wildlife sanctuary.
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Echoing the nationalist rhetoric associated with the degradation and subsequent ‘rediscovery’ 
of Anuradhapura, the army describes the development of tourist sites in the Northeast as a 
‘rediscovery’: their ‘natural beauty was earlier destroyed by LTTE terrorists after cutting 
trees and dumping explosives’.182  
The Chief Minister of the Northern Provincial Council, C.V. Wigneswaran—a man 
selected for his current position on the basis of his moderate politics and appeal to the 
Sinhalese—is now vocally critical of the process of militarisation and tourist development, 
describing the military as ‘an occupying force’, ‘taking over people’s lands, cultivating them 
with the owners having to buy the produce from their own land and building hotels and golf 
courses’, while ‘the dwelling homes of the people devastated by the war remain like pock 
marks in the Northern landscape’.183 Militarisation, Wigneswaran states, ‘takes place not due 
to any real security threat, but to maintain a stranglehold over the populace; to subjugate 
them and make them compliant; to stifle any form of democratic or political dissent’.184  
 
Anti-Muslim rhetoric, violence and displacement  
The post-war expansion of state land acquisition has also affected the Muslim community in 
the South, precisely at a moment when anti-Muslim rhetoric is at its strongest since the anti-
 Muslim riots of 1915. Those riots were the result of anti-minority rhetoric central to the rise 
of the ‘Protestant Buddhism’ overseen by Anargarika Dharmapala.185 This political Buddhist 
call to action flourished on an island populated by colonisers and dominated by the colonial 
plantation economy. Christians, Muslims, Moors and ‘foreigners’ were seen as pollutants and 
business competitors who fell outside of the ‘frontier of authenticity’ defined in Sinhala 
discourse from the mid-nineteenth century: the image of the Sinhalese peasant and the 
traditional rural economy.
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 While economic disparity was a key factor in the 1915 riots, as 
Moor traders thrived despite a period of economic hardship brought on by the outbreak of the 
First World War,
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 Sinhala nationalist groups framed the friction between the Sinhalese 
community and the Muslims as a religious and ethnic struggle, where the very existence of 
the Sinhala Buddhist civilisation was under threat.
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In June 2014, a period of anti-Muslim rhetoric by far-right Sinhala groups culminated in 
riots in Aluthgama and wider Welipitiya. The JHU (National Sinhala Heritage Party) and the 
Bodu Bala Sena (BBS)—a JHU-breakaway organisation of monks who advocate militancy 
and violence in protecting Buddhism—were accused of inciting the violence. Three people 
were killed, 78 were injured and Muslim properties were attacked and burnt down.
189
 The 
BBS—the ‘Buddhist Brigade’—have sparked moral panic among the Sinhalese about the 
purported exponential growth of the Muslim population—a claim that has no basis in 
reality—and have carried out sporadic attacks on Muslim property and mosques.190 The 
current Islamophobia, echoing 1915, relates directly to Sinhala fears of a Muslim threat to 
Buddhism and Sinhalese interests. The JHU tabled an ‘anti-conversion bill’ in Parliament in 
2005, attracting global controversy and condemnation from human rights groups.
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 The BBS 
have also launched an ‘anti-halaal’ campaign, attempted to ban the burqa and the Islamic 
legal system, issued warnings of Muslim extremism, and alleged that Muslim businesses 
were overshadowing and threatening the economic security of the Sinhalese.
192
 Muslim shop-
 owners have faced unfounded accusations of the rape and attempted conversion of Sinhalese 
girls.
193
 Gotabhaya Rajapaksa—Mahinda’s brother and former Secretary of Defence—
actively supported the BBS. He was a chief guest at a BBS seminar in 2013, where he 
defended the group’s public profile, saying that the ‘venerable monks always came forward 
to protect our country, race, religion and culture’.194  
In the eastern town of Batticaloa, where the Muslim population is highly concentrated, 
Tamil and Muslim lands have been requisitioned for Sinhalese settlement.
195
 Activists and 
human rights workers believe that the purpose is to alter the demography of the area, in order 
to undermine historical Tamil and Muslim claims to the land and ensure Sinhalese 
parliamentary representation in the region. As the Sinhala-Buddhist project ‘reclaims’ 
Muslim land, the justifying discourse is that Islam represents a threat to the safety of Sinhala-
Buddhists and that Islamic religious institutions are displacing Buddhist sacred sites.
196
 
Muslims based in the general area of Buddhist sites are framed as ‘encroachers threatening 
the Buddhist nature of the site’.197 On 20 April 2012, 2,000 Buddhists and Buddhist monks—
including members of the BBS—marched to a mosque in Dambulla in north-central Sri 
Lanka and demanded its demolition, claiming that it was built on a Buddhist site. The 
government ordered the closure of the mosque two days later.
198
 The monks demanded the 
demolition of ‘illegal’ Islamic religious sites all over Sri Lanka, wherever they exist in the 
‘sacred’ region surrounding Buddhist sites.199 This incident is illustrative of the post-war 
process of physical re-authorship—a process that intimidates, displaces and dispossesses 
minorities in favour of Sinhala-Buddhists. The monks’ demands echo the remapping and 
development of Anuradhapura, where the redesign of the ‘sacred city’ displaced thousands of 
non-Buddhist residents.
200
 In August 2013, another mosque was attacked and five people 
were injured in the Grandpass district of Colombo.
201
 The attack prompted mosque goers to 
 relocate to another mosque in a ‘more discrete location’: shying away from Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist violence, they have been displaced from their place of worship.
202
  
The contention underpinning these attacks on mosques is that the structures are actually 
built on ancient and sacred Buddhist sites. The BBS’s online manifesto declares the 
organisation’s intention to protect Buddhist archaeological sites. As Stewart observes, this 
goal seems relatively innocuous, but in practice, rationalises the destruction of, and 
necessitates restrictions on the building of, non-Buddhist constructions.
203
 The BBS has, for 
example, objected to the construction of a mosque in Kuragala, stating that the Muslims are 
destroying Buddhist rock caves in the area and deliberately displacing Buddhists, and have 
vowed to have it torn down.
204
 This process goes hand-in-hand with the ‘rediscovery’ of 
ancient Sinhala-Buddhist sites in the Tamil-dominated areas and is, in fact, not entirely new 
to the post-conflict phase. Fernando recalls how the JHU attempted to undercut and oppose 
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the state and LTTE on a platform of regaining 
Sinhala heritage—a powerful populist idea.205 The party’s then leader, Ellāvala Mēdhānanda 
Thera, travelled to the Eastern Province to propagate the notion that ancient Sinhala-Buddhist 
sites in the region were ‘vandalised’, ‘desecrated’, ‘destroyed’ and ‘occupied’ by the LTTE, 
Muslims and by treasure hunters.
206
 The Thera’s public writings perpetuated a narrative of 
historical and perpetual Tamil invasion and of Muslim occupation and neglect of Sinhalese 
land and cultural and religious artefacts. In one article, he states: ‘It is with great patriotism 
we invite the Siṃhala people to colonise these areas once again’.207  
In the post-war period, Sinhalese politicians have insinuated that the Tamils and the 
Muslims, who make up a majority of the population in the north-eastern provinces, may form 
a dangerous alliance as Provincial Councils are elected in the East and North. Addressing the 
10th annual JHU congress, party leader Patali Champika Ranawaka made a speech designed 
to spark concern about minority solidarity, stating that Tamil and Muslim parties had already 
 allied to grab power in the Eastern Provincial Council and toppled the rule of the Sinhala-
Buddhist United People’s Freedom Alliance.208 The process of dispossession and 
intimidation underway post war has so far undermined inter-community solidarity and 
prevented minorities from uniting against the oppressive Sinhala-Buddhist state. 
 
Conclusion  
This article has explored the Sinhala-Buddhist re-authorship of public and ‘sacred’ spaces in 
Sri Lanka, describing the continuity of this process from Independence and how it has come 
to define the state’s post-war nation-building project. These processes, I have argued, are 
generated by a longstanding Sinhala-Buddhist territorial entitlement revived in anti-colonial 
resistance narratives and couched in the rise of the nation state in the international order. The 
Rajapaksa Government, in the massacre that ended the war in 2009, defeated the Tamil 
‘other’ constructed in a contemporary, militaristic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and made 
good on its promise to deliver the unitary state. This article has described Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist inscriptions on the land, where physical sites are energised with meaning as 
vehicles of nationalist ideology and conflict memory. Imposing this dominant narrative is an 
effort to erase Tamil history and to denigrate and depoliticise the Tamil nationalist 
movement. The process amounts to ‘denial of the memory of resistance’209—particularly 
evident in the state’s authorship of conflict history as ‘terrorism’ in tourist sites—and is 
practiced in pursuance of a politics of minority subordination and dispossession. The 
encroachment of Sinhalese settlements and military encampments into the Tamil-dominated 
Northeast is bound up with economic and military prerogatives and the markers of militaristic 
triumph—memorials and sites of war tourism—are ‘mnemonic practices’ 210 loaded with 
nationalist territorial associations of ‘re-conquest’ that actively inform majoritarian collective 
memory.  
 Public and private land has been seized in the process of consolidating the ‘unitary 
state’: a Sinhala-Buddhist project and a geopolitical accomplishment that necessitates 
physical domination of Tamil territory and ‘reclamation’ of Muslim space. The haste to 
colonise, dispossess and oppress the Tamil people since the end of the war also suggests that 
the state is wary of future Tamil resistance and acts as a reminder to the Muslim population to 
keep their allegiance to the state in check. Tamils, Muslims and all minorities are presented in 
discourse as inhabiting Sri Lanka at the sufferance of the Sinhalese; this discourse finds 
expression in sporadic attacks on minorities and the assertion of power over space. Minorities 
are reminded that the power to author space belongs to the Sinhala-Buddhist majority and 
that this performance of identity and power, of ethnicity and culture, is protected and 
promoted by the state.  
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